In the previous series of articles, we saw the background and reasons
of the total and extensive defeat in East Ladakh, inflicted on India
by Chinese in 1962. Actually, this war was fought on two fronts,
which were physically separated by thousands of miles. Besides
Ladakh, another important front, where this war was also fought, was
opened in Arunachal Pradesh, located in North East corner of India.
In east Ladakh, China and India had a dispute regarding territory of
Aksaichin and the war there, was mainly fought over that issue. As
against that, except for a very minor dispute regarding few border
posts, there was no such standing dispute existing in Arunachal
Pradesh (It was known as Northeast frontier agency or NEFA then.) at
that time. Any student of history would realize even after a brief
study, that China had raised this dispute in Arunachal Pradesh, so
that when eventual negotiations would open about Aksaichin in east
Ladakh, it would appear to observers, that China was ready for give
and take. The steps taken by China in this regard, were planned and
executed very carefully. Let us first consider certain political
developments that took place before the war.
We saw
earlier that the border between Tibet and India was demarcated in a
tripartite meeting between representatives of British India, Tibet
and China in 1914 held in Shimla. The border in NEFA or Arunachal
Pradesh was finalized later, when a British officer, Captain Bailey
had carried out an extensive survey of the region. A map showing this
border line on a map was later attached to the draft of the treaty.
This line became known after the name of the British representative
who had participated in the meeting, as McMahon line. A special
feature of this line was that for 95% of the region, this line
followed a clear line of geographical features such as tops of
mountain ranges. This line begins in the east from the 15283 feet
high Hkakabo Razi mountain peak known as on the Tri-junction point
of the borders of India, Tibet and Myanmar, about 18 Km north of the
Diphu pass. From here it crosses the Lohit river basin and follows
the mountain peaks along Gangri- Karpo pass- Yongqyap pass- Tunga
pass to Bum pass north of the town of Tawang in the west. From here
it goes along Zanglung ridge and ThagLa Ridge to meet another Tri
Junction point on borders of Tibet, India and Bhutan. Even when we
take a look on this border on a map, it becomes immediately clear
that this is a natural geographical frontier between two countries.
Majority
areas in this region are unreachable and impassable with high peaks
of towering heights to 5000 Meters, deep valleys, thick forests and
heavy uncontrolled torrential rivers. The monsoon rains in this
region are bountiful, providing continuous water supply to rivers. In
addition this heavy rain converts the plains into swamps. During
monsoons, even commuting becomes difficult in this region. No person
perhaps could even imagine, that a country would ever create border
disputes with neighbours in such kind of terrain.
After
establishing their power over complete China in 1949, Mao and other
Chinese leaders started creating border and other disputes with
almost all of Chinese major neighbours. Korean War, Sino-USSR war,
border war with India and then war with Vietnam are few examples of
this strategy. In autocratically ruled countries, not much importance
is given to lives of ordinary citizens or soldiers and they are
expandable, when state policy demands so. Chinese leadership under
Mao, perhaps never bothered about the manpower losses of the PLA, as
long as it served their purpose.
The
relations between India and China, appeared to be cordial and
friendly till year 1954. Indian Government under Jawaharlal Nehru
considered China as a great friend and helped it getting admission
into United nations. Nehru and China's premier signed on five
principles of peaceful existence known as Panchsheel in this period.
Many people think that Nehru did this to brighten his international
image. In 1950, PLA invaded Tibet and annexed it. Dalai Lama of Tibet
had then made a request for Military assistance to India. Even US and
England were more than willing to provide Military help to India, if
India was willing to assist Dalai Lama. If India would have accepted
this request and gone into Tibet, the scenario over entire Chinese
borders would have been totally different today. Unfortunately not
only India refused to help Dalai Lama, it also agreed in 1954 that
Tibet was a part of China without any quid pro quo. Many historians
consider this as one of the disastrous mistakes of the Indian
Government for which history would never forgive Nehru. The
repercussions of this grave error started showing within next 4
years. In 1954 itself Chinese declared areas near Barahoti as
belonging to them. In 1956, China invaded border regions near Tunjun
La and Shipki La. In 1958, China started construction of road through
Aksaichin region belonging to India and showed in a map published
that year, a huge part of Indian territory as belonging to China. The
crowning act came in November 1958, when Chinese Government informed
India that it does not agree with any border agreements drawn
previously and entire Sino-Indian border should be demarcated again.
On 31
March 1959, Tibet's Dalai Lama asked for Political Asylum in India
and Indian Government granted it. Within 6 months, Chinese Government
unexpectedly declared that they no longer accept the McMahon line
between Tibet and NEFA or Arunachal Pradesh as the official border
and announced that entire NEFA region belongs to China. This peaceful
border suddenly became a disputed one and the border guards of ITBP
now faced a major challenge about defending this border.
For
many years before this, Chinese army or PLA had been fighting wars
somewhere or other. From 1950 to 1951, they had fought in Korea.
After this, came the invasion of Tibet. This had made them battle
hardened and ready. Chinese armed forces were substantially
modernized in this decade with newer and better arms, vehicles and
fighter aircraft with the help of Soviet Union. After digging out
border disputes with India, Chinese leadership started preparing for
inevitable war. New motorable roads or at least such ones by which
mules can be taken loaded with ordnance or supplies for soldiers were
built by China over entire Tibet-India border. New Depots were
created to stock supplies for army. Soldiers were provided with
automatic rifles and warm clothing and other equipments for the harsh
winter months. As Chinese incurred in further minor skirmishes on the
border, the strength of Chinese soldiers was increased. By 1962,
there were 18 Battalions (18000 to 20000 fighting men) on NEFA or
Arunachal Pradesh border.
India
obviously was in the knowledge of these Chinese intentions and
actions. Since 1952 the chief of Intelligence,for Indian Government
Mr. Malik, was cautioning and warning Government of India on almost
continuous basis. Unfortunately Nehru never believed that China would
actually invade India on large scale and he was always confident that
his peace strategy would be effective. ( It has now come to light
from the correspondence that India's then Home minister, Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel, had been warning Nehru about real Chinese
intentions since 1950. Prime minister Nehru apparently preferred to
neglect home minister's cautions.) Nehru had appointed in those
tumultuous years, an ex bureaucrat, famous for his flaring rage as
well as strange and cranky behaviour, Mr. Krishna Menon, as his
defense minister. He earnestly believed in local production of arms
and ordnance. Credit must be given to him for starting ,many ordnance
factories all over India. However, he was a very obstinate person to
get along and never really bothered to listen to point of view of
others. Because of this reason, Indian army chief, General Thimayya
had quit from his post.
It is
a bitter truth that Nehru believed that he would be able to solve all
international disputes on the strength of his international image as
a world leader. Because of this peace doctrine, Indian armed were
forces were a neglected lot in the 1950's decade with political
leadership turning cold shoulders towards them. There are many
example of this, like Army personnel defending the border, not being
provided with essential warm clothing for harsh winters or continuing
widespread use of 0.303 bore single bolt action Enfield rifles of WW
II vintage, when everyone else had shifted to automatic recoil less
rifles. Besides this, army was not even provided with suitable
vehicles for rapid movement in hilly border areas.
In
1962, after General Thimayya's resignation, General Thapar was made
chief of army staff. Eastern command(Which also had jurisdiction over
NEFA or Arunachal Pradesh) was led by Lt. Gen L.P. Sen and assisted
by Maj.Gen. B.M. Kaul, Maj. Gen. Umrao Singh, Maj. Gen Niranjan
Prasad and Brigadier Dalvi, who reported to him. Maj.Gen. B.M. Kaul
was comparatively an inexperienced officer, having been promoted out
of turn, because of some unknown reasons.
We
have already seen above, the geographical situation in NEFA, where a
new border dispute was now created by China. This entire region was
divided into five parallel districts known as Kameng, Subansiri,
Siang, Tyuting and Lohit divisions. For each of these divisions, the
geography was similar and included high Himalaya ranges to north,
rivers originating there and flowing south and dense jungles and
forests in the foothills and valleys towards the south. Tawang was
the biggest town in Kameng division. In the eastern division of
Lohit, there were tow townships at Kibithu and Walong. Unfortunately
no proper roads existed between rail heads in Assam in the south to
these towns. Motorable roads existed to certain distance. There were
only mule tracks beyond that and in the far north, there were only
foot tracks or ways for the men. This was a generalized scene over
entire NEFA.
(To be
concluded)
20th
October 2012
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