India's
northeastern border with Tibet, being a natural geographical border
formed along series of snow clad Himalayan peaks, can be crossed
only through few natural mountain passes on the mountain ridges or by
walking along the foot ways formed on the narrow banks in the basins
of three or four torrential rivers, that cross this natural border.
Because of this natural protection and also considering the fact,
that there was absolutely no border dispute of any kind till 1959,
between India and Tibet, British India Government had never taken
any military steps to safe guard this border. Few border posts near
the mountain passes and the river beds were established by British
India Government to secure these places. This policy was continued by
Independent India under premiership of Nehru. Since there were no
roads in this region, most of these frontier posts in the NEFA region
were maintained by airdrops of all essential provisions to Assam
Rifles policemen, guarding these border posts till 1959.
In
August 1959, in a surprise move, Chinese attacked Indian position at
Longju in Subanseri sector. About 200 to 300 Chinese soldiers
attacked few Assam Rifles Policemen guarding this post. There was a
small number of policemen guarding this post and they defended this
post for 2 days gallantly. After that, they had to withdraw in the
interior. This had happened even prior to Kongka
Pass incident,
described by me earlier, that took place in east Ladakh, during
October 1959. In November 1959, Chinese unilaterally declared that
they no longer accept McMahon line as the agreed boundary between
India and Tibet. It can be said that attack on Longju post was in a
way a precursor for the things to come.
As a
response to new Chinese postures, Indian Government had decided in
1959 itself, to increase number of army posts on the NEFA border,. It
was also decided by the Government in Delhi to construct more foot
ways, bridges and mule tracks along the border so that supplies can
be reached to new military posts on the border in a faster time
frame. However it took very long for the Government machinery to
actually implement the policy decisions and construction began only
in summer of 1962 though 34 new border posts were already set up
nearer to McMahon line.
Even
though new posts were established, no bridges, roads or mule tracks
were ready till summer of 1962, which would have ensured that the
supplies reach the posts in a quicker time span. Because of this
reason, supplies were made to these forward posts by para dropping
with help from Indian air force. A Chinese report mentions that most
of the supplies never reached the men because of the extremely hilly
region. Since the posts were not connected to each other by tracks or
roads, they remained essentially isolated and were unable to provide
cover to each other as is normally planned when setting up such
posts. All these deficiencies were pointed out by the local
commanders to Army HQ and then to concerned Government ministers.
Unfortunately, these complaints fell on deaf ears as both prime
minister Nehru and defense minister Krishna Menon were of the firm
opinion that China would only continue with minor incursions and
never would launch a full scale conflict. The advanced border posts
now set up would be able to effectively handle and control any such
Chinese incursions in future.
Battle of Namka Chu
I have
mentioned earlier that the McMahon line follows the Himalayan peaks
all along the border. However, near the Tri-junction point of the
borders of Bhutan, India and Tibet, there was a minor border dispute
between India and China. A small river, which swells only during
monsoons, flows from this Tri-junction point to east, between two
mountain ridges known as Tsangdhar Ridge in the south of river and
Thagla Ridge in the north of the river, till it confluences with
Nyamjang Chu river. (Another small river). According to India's
position, McMahon line passes along Thagla ridge from the
Tri-junction point, to Nyamjang Chu river and then continues along
Wadung ridge to Bum La, whereas Chinese maintained that the border
passed along Tsangdhar Ridge to Nyamjang Chu river. The Namka Chu
river valley is extremely narrow and large scale troupe movements are
almost impossible here.
Out of
the new posts set up in NEFA in 1959, one army post known as Dhola
post, was set up on the southern bank of this Namka Chu river.
Another post on the bank of Nyamjang Chu river further to north was
also then set up at Khinzemane. Chinese soldiers had attacked this
post in 1959 and had pushed Indians back from this post. Indians had
reoccupied this post after Chinese had gone back and were holding it
till 1962 Autumn.
In
Agust-September 1962, Chinese army brought in their men in large
numbers to the Thagla ridge area. Army sources reported to Delhi that
about 400 Chinese were now positioned on Thagla ridge. Presence of
Chinese in such large numbers was a direct threat to posts at Dhola
and Khinzemane. After this news reached Delhi, Defense minister
Krishna Menon suggested to Chief of Army staff, General Thapar that
the Chinese on Thagla ridge should be immediately evicted from there.
Knowing the ground realities well, General Thapar tried to argue
with the defense minister about futility of any such major action in
that narrow area. He was however told that considering the political
pressure on Prime minister Nehru, this order has to be obeyed by the
army.
Till
September end, there were only incidences of minor skirmishes in
Namka Chu valley with overall military situation fairly stable.
However large number of Indian troupes descended in this area on
orders from Delhi in next few days. This large scale arrival of
Indian troupes in this narrow valley was hallmarked with total
disarray, disorder, confusion and mismanagement not usually
associated with a military movement on this scale. The soldiers did
not have enough warm clothing, ordnance was in short supply. Troupes
provided with mortar launchers had no mortars to launch. There was
paucity of guns and being such a narrow valley and that to on the
international border, para dropping was not feasible. After realizing
the desperate situation of these new arrivals, the officer in charge
of the operation, Maj.Gen Umrao Singh, bitterly complained to his
seniors in Delhi. This resulted into a decision, which had direct
bearings on the final outcome of the conflict. Maj.Gen Umarao Singh
was abruptly transferred and in his place a comparatively
inexperienced officer, Maj. Gen. B.M. Kaul was brought in as officer
in command. In an most surprising decision Ma.Gen. Kaul was ordered
to liaison directly with Prime minister Nehru and not through normal
official channel of Army HQ or chief of army staff. It can be said
that Chief of Army staff, General Thapar disassociated himself with
the Namka Chu operation completely. In next fortnight, approximately
2500 Indian soldiers arrived in Namka Chu valley. The strategic
battle plan prepared by Maj. Gen. B.M. Kaul has been discussed in
many forums over the years, including some on the internet and there
is unanimity of opinion that in the history, very rarely one may
find, anything as disastrous as this.An excellent account of the battle can be read on this link.
The
Chinese saw arrival of such large numbers of Indian soldiers in Namka
Chu valley as a big danger sign and Chinese soldiers also started
arriving in very large numbers. By 20th
October 1962, as many as 30000 Chinese soldiers arrived on Thagla
ridge area. Only after their arrival, Maj. Gen. B.M.Kaul came to
realization that he had brought such large numbers of his own
soldiers in a death trap. However it was too late now. On 21st
October 1962 Chinese crossed Namka Chu river and captured all Indian
positions on the south bank of the river. On 23rd
October 1962, Government in Beijing allowed PLA to cross McMahon line
as and when required. Indian army soon realized that it was
impossible to launch any counter offensives because enemy had all the
advantages and they started retreating. Within next 5 days of
massacre and debacle, India army was pushed back 10 miles to south of
McMahon line to Lumpo.
Indian
army units lost large numbers of soldiers in this close battle.
Second Rajput lost 282 men out of 513 deployed. Gurakhas lost 80 men
and 90 were captured. 493 soldiers of Seventh Brigade were killed in
this battle. It is to the credit of the Indian soldiers that they
fought with much bravery and gallantry under adverse conditions in
which they were pushed. Chinese too, lost a huge number of men in
this battle. Indian men, who had fought at Namka Chu received as many
as 15 top gallantry awards later. From the number of these awards, it
is possible to imagine the high moral and bravery of Indian soldiers
with which they had fought this battle. A memorial for Namka Chu
battle was later erected near Lumpo. However because of extreme
weather conditions, it got damaged and finally a 40 feet tall proper and befitting war
memorial was erected in the town of Tawang in 1999.
A
writer, Neville Maxwell writes in his book 'India’s China War' that
if General Thapar would have resigned when ordered to evict Chinese
from Thagla ridge, probably 1962 war might not have happened at all.
I do not agree with this, because the basic aim of Chinese in 1962
war was to secure the Aksaichin road in Ladakh and they would have
gone to any length and would have started this war later, if not at
that point of time.
The
defeat of Indian army in the battle of Namka Chu is considered as an
extremely important event for any historical Military strategy
study. The total failure of the Generals to take decisions after
considering ground realities, mismanagement, WW II vintage arms, lack
of warm clothing, unacclimatized troupes and extremely immature
political leadership, are some of the reasons that brought in such a
big defeat with loss of hundreds of brave soldiers and officers.
Regretfully, I have to say that the gates of NEFA were opened to
China because of this unnecessary war on a totally wrong kind of
battlefield.
The
battle strategy plan envisaged by Maj. Gen. B.M.Kaul for Namka Chu,
had no provision of a defensive front at the rear of the McMahon
line, in case the front line soldiers were defeated due to some
reason and had to fall back. Perhaps in the undue haste with which
soldiers were sent to Namka Chu, this fact was never thought or
planned and no reserve force was kept at the rear. With all positions
of the army near Thagla ridge now overtaken by Chinese, and Indian
army retreating and running away from the battle zone, there were no
forces left for protection of Tawang town any more.
( To
be concluded)
22
October 2012
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