The
war, which began on 12th of October 1962, in the Kameng sector of
NEFA or Arunachal Pradesh, ended on 19th November with Chinese forces
capturing Bomdi La. In this very period, fighting had also erupted
in other sectors of Arunachal Pradesh. Lohit sector is the
easternmost sector of Arunachal Pradesh, bordering with Myanmar. This
sector, with Lohit river flowing from north to south, is formed of
the river basin and adjoining hilly regions. From Geographical
considerations, it can be said that to enter Arunachal Pradesh from
Tibet side is much easier in this sector. (From Lohit River basin).
Because of this reason, there were number of army outposts on both
banks of Lohit river, which could give cover to each other and were
well stocked. Walong village is located to east of Lohit river nearer
to the Tri- junction point on the borders of India, Myanmar and
Tibet. Walong village and Kibithu villages had important army posts.
However, as elsewhere else, there was no motorable road between Assam
and Kibithu village. All ordnance and other provisions were supplied
to Lohit division outposts by para dropping from air.
The
account of the battles fought in Lohit river basin, clearly shows a
major difference between strategy adopted by unit commanders here as
compared to Tawang sector. The war was fought here as per a plan.
The sector was well defended by the army posts, which could give
covering fire to each other with the result that War in Walong sector
turned out to be a bad dream for Chinese, whose losses were at least
five times more than Indian losses. During the period 18th October to
25th October, Chinese forces, one division strong (about 15000 men),
attacked the positions held by 6th Kumaon Rifles units of Indian army
here. The positions here were so well defended that Chinese were not
able to capture even an inch of land and had to suffer actually
number of counter attacks by Indian forces.
The
entire eastern front was quiet during the period from 25th
October to 13th
November as Chinese were consolidating their gains. In the Indian
camp in the Lohit sector also, chaos and confusion did prevail,
like Kameng sector, but to much lesser extent. Troops numbering about
300, newly arrived, but before they could be assigned to any post,
were shifted back somewhere else. The chaos remained limited mainly
because of the smaller number of troops. All initial attacks after
13th
November were effectively repulsed. Finally when Chinese started
attacks on Indian posts with involvement of 4000 troops, Indian
defenders were forced to retreat on orders. In the over all
confusion, some of the posts never received retreat orders. Troops
posted there fought till the end or were captured. Sepoy Keval Singh
received posthumously the highest gallantry award “ Maha Veer
Chakra” along with other 10 men and officers who received “Veer
Chakra” gallantry awards. On 16th
November, Maj.Gen. B.M.Kaul ordered the army positioned in Lohit
sector, to fall back and Chinese captured entire Lohit river basin
after that. Surprisingly, just two days before the retreat order,
Indian forces had launched their first major counter attack on
Chinese forces. There should bot be any doubt that Indian troops gave
a befitting reply to Chinese near Walong in Lohit river basin.
As
mentioned by me earlier, in Subansiri sector, Chinese had gone on an
offensive at Longju, since August 1962 itself. The Indian troops
positioned in this sector kept on receiving contradicting orders and
were ordered to fall back even without a fight. At many posts in this
sector, Indian troops were ordered to retreat even before a bullet
was fired and when Chinese were just re grouping and later again
ordered to position themselves in the same bunkers, when new orders
were received. In such chaotic situation, Chinese troops captured
most of the frontier positions of Indian troops even without firing
a single bullet or fighting.
In
Siang sector, Indian troops defended their positions and considerable
fighting took place. Here also Indian were forced to fall back when
large number of Chinese troops attacked and finally Indians withdrew
from Menchuka and Tuting towns.
When
Chinese announced unilateral cease fire on 21st
November, Chinese forces had made huge inroads in all sectors of
Arunachal Pradesh. Considering from any possible angle or way, the
positions of both armies on 21st
November were such that it was impossible to deny the fact that
Chinese army had inflicted a huge and devastating defeat on the
Indian army. In first week of December, Chinese announced that their
army would fall back 20 Km behind line of actual control and the war
was practically over.
It can
not be denied that this 31 day war between China and India, has made
a deep impacting scar on Indian minds and psyche. Some political
commentators have tried to hide the real impact by saying that for
Indian population this was a sad and depressing surprise. Nothing can
be far from the truth. This war proved to Indian people that
Government propaganda in Nehru era, regarding 2000 year friendship
between China and India was completely false and did not have even
an iota of truth in it. The war made Indians aware, about war
mongering of the Mao regime in China and the realization that in
future, India would have to watch every Chinese move with suspicion
and caution and then react to it on merits of the case.
For
prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, this war was a greatest betrayal by
a friend, whom he had held in great esteem. He never really
recovered from the shock and within 2 years died.
This
war was not all bad things for India. Many good things also came out
of it for the country. As I have mentioned in my series of articles
on war in Ladakh, this war made India forget the dreamy notions like
Non Alignment and “Panchshil” and was forced to realize the Real
Politic that controls international relations in the real world. The
Government of India realized the great blunder that it had
perpetuated for last 14 years in neglecting the Indian armed forces.
In the later years, armed forces were again provided with requisite
strength, funds and the forces regained their importance.
Lastly,
before I close this long series of articles, let us try to reason,
why did China enter this war? Many military experts and strategists
have tried to give answers or explanations of this puzzle. The
reasons given, extend from teaching a lesson to India to internal
strife in that country. When China started this war, they had
already captured and were controlling the region of Aksaichin, which
they wanted for building Xinjiang-Tibet road. It therefore becomes
difficult to understand the logic and rationale of Chinese in
starting this war. When they had the land in their hands already, why
did they start such a war and allowed thousands of their own
countrymen to die for no apparent reason or advantage as in any case,
Chinese forces went back to their original positions after the war.
I
recently read about a new way of reasoning for this war and Chinese
rationale for it. Mr. Bruce. A . Elleman is an associate professor at
Center for Naval Warfare studies in Naval War college of Texas
Christian University in USA. In his book, Modern Chinese Warfare
1795-1989, Mr. Elleman , puts forth his thinking about a possible
Chinese rationale for this war.
According
to Mr. Elleman, after the Korean war of 1951, wherein, China and
Soviet Union were actively collaborating with each other, their
ideological differences started widening regarding who should assume
the role of leadership of socialist nations of this world. Elleman
says that Chinese started and fought 1962 war with India, 1969 war
with Soviet union and 1979 war with Vietnam to show to the socialist
world, that China is the real big daddy of the socialist world and
Soviet Union is not trust worthy friend at all. Since Soviet Union
was a close friend of India and Vietnam, Chinese wanted to prove to
them and other socialist nations that friendship with Soviet Union
would serve no purpose in hour of need. Even though China won the war
with India, it was badly beaten in Vietnam war, which has a striking
similarity with 1962 war with India.
Whatever
may be the real Chinese Rationale, 1962 war made India understand
fully what Winston Churchill meant in his famous quote. “A nation
has no permanent enemies and no permanent friends, only permanent
interests.” In 1962, India was a young and idealistic nation with
false ideas about the international affairs. 1962 war made India
mature and come off age. There is no doubt about that.
At the
end I would like to pose the same question to readers, which I did
ask earlier. Who actually defeated Indian army in 1962? Was it the
Chinese? or someone else? I have no answer. It is up to the readers
to find it.
Concluded
24
October 2012
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